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"Basis of the Bargain": Transcending
Classical Concepts
John E. Murray, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been unclear whether "basis of the bargain" in
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) section 2-313(1) incorpo-
rates a reliance test.' Professor John Honnold questioned the
assumption that section 2-313 retained the reliance require-
ment of the Uniform Sales Act as early as 1955.2 Twenty-five
years later, in 1980, Professors White and Summers reported no
progress on attempts to penetrate the enigma.3 The U.C.C.'s
enlargement of express warranties to include not only promises
or affirmations of fact, but also descriptions and samples or
models,4 was a change from the predecessor statute which
caused little disconcertion.5 To become an express warranty,
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. U.C.C. § 2-313(1). All references to the U.C.C. will be to the 1978 official
text with comments. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the ba-
sis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model
2. "But this assumption cannot be made with confidence since (i) 'basis
of the bargain' does not convey a definite meaning, and (ii) the Code's rejection
of the present reliance language might well imply an intent to modify present
law." 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAw REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE LAw
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 393
(1955).
3. "The Code omits any explicit mention of reliance and requires only
that the promise or affirmation become 'part of the basis of the bargain.' The
extent to which the law has so been changed is thoroughly unclear." J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 332 (2d ed. 1980).
4. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (c).
5. Under the Uniform Sales Act, sales by description (§ 14) and sales by
sample (§ 16) were implied warranties. But even Professor Williston in inter-
preting the Sales Act § 14 stated: 'The warranty might more properly, however,
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however, the promise, affirmation, description, sample, or
model must be a "part of the basis of the bargain" under sec-
tion 2-313(1).6 The deliberate exclusion of a reliance require-
ment from this definition of an express warranty 7 signaled a
significant change from the Uniform Sales Act, which expressly
required reliance.8 Some courts simply ignore the U.C.C.'s de-
letion of reliance and hold that reliance continues as a require-
ment.9 Others recognize that reliance is unnecessary and that
"basis of the bargain" is the test, but find it impossible to ex-
plain the test's meaning or application.O In fact, they often un-
wittingly resort to a reliance test in different garb. When the
courts and the commentators" indicate that the phrase "basis
of the bargain" continues to mystify them, another attempt to
clarify its meaning is worthwhile.
This Article will demonstrate that the underlying difficulty
in the existing literature is the failure to recognize the concept
of "bargain" as a continuum neither restricted to classical no-
tions of bargained-for-exchange nor requiring express or im-
plied reliance for statements of fact about goods to operate as
express warranties. The mysterious phrase "basis of the bar-
gain" cannot be understood without understanding the under-
lying philosophy of Article 2 of the U.C.C. and related
be called express, since it is based on the language of the parties." 1 S. Wnmus-
TON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAw AND UNDER THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 223 (rev. ed. 1948).
6. U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
7. The express mention of a reliance requirement in section 2-315 sug-
gests that the drafters purposely omitted the requirement from 2-313. U.C.C.
section 2-315 states that an implied warranty is formed if the "seller at the time
of contracting has reason to know... that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment." For a discussion of section 2-315, see Valley Iron & Steel Co.
v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 107, 562 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1977); Roupp v. Gear, 253 Pa.
Super. Ct. 46, 49, 384 A.2d 968, 970 (1978).
8. The Uniform Sales Act section 12 provided that "[a]ny affirmation of
fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if
the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." (em-
phasis added).
9. See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
10. See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
11. The commentators have disagreed as to the meaning of "basis of the
bargain." Some find that the Code eliminates the concept of reliance alto-
gether. See R NORDSTROM, LAw OF SALES §§ 66-68 (1970); Note, "Basis of the
Bargain"-What Role Reliance?, 34 U. Prrr. L REv. 145, 150 (1972). Others have
said that the "basis of the bargain" requirement merely shifts the burden of
proving non-reliance to the seller. See 1 STATE BAR OF CAnIFORNIA, COMMITTEE
ON CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CAIoRNI COMMERCIAL LAw 210
(1966); J. WHIT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 332; Boyd, Representing Con-
sumers-The Uniform Commercial Code and Beyond, 9 AiZ. L REv. 372, 385
(1968).
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expressions of purpose in Article 1. Thus, this Article will offer
a new exploration of both the statutory language of section 2-
313 and related Article 2 sections and their comments. It will
conduct a survey of the critical case law to demonstrate current
judicial confusion, and will review the two leading textual treat-
ments of "basis of the bargain" to provide contrasting perspec-
tives of the conventional wisdom. Only then will it be possible
to structure a new analysis of the disconcerting "basis of the
bargain" requirement.
1. THE STATUTES
A. THE UNIFORm SALES ACT
Because the U.C.C. does not define 'part," "basis," or "bar-
gain," a search for an explanation inevitably proceeds to the
most likely source, the predecessor statute. Section 12 of the
Uniform Sales Act made affirmations of fact or promises relat-
ing to the goods express warranties "if the natural tendency of
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase
the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon."' 2 A reasonable interpretation of this language is that
buyers must prove both that the affirmation or promise induced
them to purchase the goods, and that they relied upon the
statement in purchasing the goods.13 The difficulty for buyers
in proving reliance was obvious. Therefore, Professor Williston,
the author of the Sales Act, suggested a different interpreta-
tion. Williston recognized that the Sales Act placed the burden
of proof of reliance on buyers, but he suggested that, "as a gen-
eral rule no evidence of reliance by the buyer is necessary
other than the seller's statement were of a kind which naturally
would induce the buyer to purchase the goods and that he did
purchase the goods."' 4
Under the Williston analysis, buyers did not have to show
that the statement actually induced them to purchase the
goods, nor that they actually relied upon the statement in
12. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 12.
13. See, e.g., Beckett v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427
(1941). The court held that a printed card attached to a tube of mascara which
stated that the make-up was "runproof and harmless," combined with state-
ments by a salesperson made after the sale that the mascara was "supposed to
be the best," were insufficient to prove the essential element of reliance. The
Supreme Court of Illinois found that the plaintiff did not read the card prior to
the sale, and the statement of the salesperson was made after completion of
the transaction. Id. at 475, 34 N.E.2d at 430.
14. 1 S. WILLmsTON, supra note 5, at § 206.
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purchasing. As long as buyers showed that a reasonable buyer
would have been induced to purchase by such a statement,
they fully met their burden of proof.15 It is possible to interpret
the new "part of the basis of the bargain" requirement in sec-
tion 2-313 as a simple adoption of that interpretation of the
predecessor statute. Removing any express requirement of re-
liance upholds the Williston view. By insisting that the affirma-
tion of fact or promise relating to the goods becomes only a
part of the basis of the bargain, the drafters of 2-313 relieved
buyers from showing that the particular statement of the seller
was the only, or even the most important, basis for the deal.16
According to the other pre-Code suggestion, the U.C.C. drafters
were concentrating on the actual inducement of buyers through
the seller's statements of fact about the goods. If buyers must
show that the seller's statements actually induced them to
purchase, the test is more stringent than the Williston interpre-
tation of the Sales Act test.17 This is reminiscent of the classi-
cal dictum of Holmes explaining the bargained-for-exchange
element of consideration:
No matter what the actual motive may have been, by the express or
implied terms of the supposed contract, the promise and the considera-
tion must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at
least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment
or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is
wanting.18
If the buyers can prove that they were induced to purchase by
the statements of the seller, and if the goods do not conform to
those statements of fact, buyers can claim there was no con-
tract for failure of consideration. Section 2-313(1) would then
15. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Kennedy, 328 Mass. 90, 93, 101 N.E.2d 892, 894
(1951). In O'Connell, statements by a seller that a horse was sound, clever,
well-trained, and had a great record were sufficient to authorize a finding that
the natural tendency of such an affirmation was of the type that would induce a
buyer to purchase a horse. See also Teter v. Schultz, 110 Ind. App. 541, 547, 39
N.E.2d 802, 804 (1942); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 347, 241 P.2d 914,
918 (1952).
16. As the Article demonstrates later, this integration is incorrect. See
notes 20-46 infra and accompanying text. In addition to the arguments found in
that section, one could note that Karl Llewellyn and his helpers were undoubt-
edly well aware of the Williston test. If the U.C.C. drafters intended the new
basis of the bargain to be the Williston test, they arguably would have included
the test in express terms rather than assuming it would judicially evolve.
17. The cases cited in note 15 supra indicate that the test for finding an ex-
press warranty is not whether the actual buyer relied, but whether the state-
ments possessed the characteristic of an inducement to purchase. For a
discussion of the differences between the actual buyer and reasonable buyer
approach, see Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 487 (3d
Cir. 1965) (Freedman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965).
18. Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903).
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be nothing more than a restatement of the bargained-for-ex-
change element of consideration.19
B. THE UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE
At first glance, the comments to U.C.C. section 2-313 do not
appear to rule out Williston's "natural inducement" test.20
Comment 3 suggests that "no particular reliance on [affirma-
tions of fact] need be shown."2 1 The implication that some gen-
eral or assumed reliance must be shown is, however, not
implausible. How does a buyer show such general or assumed
reliance? The remainder of Comment 3 contains an interesting
suggestion. "Rather, any fact which is to take such affirma-
tions, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirna-
tive proof. The issue normally is one of fact."22 Under this
clause, the buyer must prove that the seller made a statement
of fact relating to the goods. It is presumed that such a state-
ment became part of the "agreement" which section 1-201(3)
defines as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.
.. ."23 To rebut that presumption, the seller must show "clear
affirmative proof' that the statement of fact was not part of the
agreement.24 The only other language relating to the presump-
tion and the burden on the seller to rebut it is found in Com-
ment 8 to section 2-313: "What statements . . . have in the
circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the
basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements
of the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the
contrary."25
19. This interpretation, too, is arguably incorrect. See notes 26-46 infra and
accompanying text.
20. Comment language is obviously not as persuasive as the enacted lan-
guage of the Code. Yet, the comments contain a wealth of material which
should not be overlooked. The original comments were prepared by those who
drafted the Code, and the new comments were prepared by the Permanent Ed-
itorial Board. Thus, although the comments are not legislation, they are an ex-
cellent source for Code construction. For a discussion of the scope of Code
comments, see R. NoRDsTOM, supra note 11, at 10 ('"The Comments often ex-
plain why certain statutory language was chosen, what policies were sought to
be adopted or rejected, and how the section under consideration harmonizes
with other parts of the Code. This material is just too valuable to be ignored.").
21. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 3.
22. Id.
23. U.C.C. § 1-201(4).
24. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 3.
25. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 8.
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What is the "clear affirmative proof' or a "good reason to
the contrary" that will excuse sellers from the duty to deliver
goods which conform to their statements of fact? If the seller
made a statement of fact relating to the goods, it would ordina-
rily not seem possible for the seller to show that a reasonable
buyer may not have been induced, at least in part, to purchase
the goods because of this statement. Nor would it appear possi-
ble for the seller to show that a reasonable buyer may not have
relied, at least in part, upon such statements in purchasing the
goods. In some cases, the seller can show that, even though a
reasonable buyer may have been so induced or may have relied
upon the statement, the particular, actual buyer did not. The
clearest example is a buyer who was unaware of a seller's
statements prior to the purchase of the goods. Absent any
knowledge of those statements of fact, the buyer could not have
been induced to buy the goods nor could he have relied upon
such statements in buying them. If presumed inducement or
reliance by a reasonable buyer initially satisfied the "basis of
the bargain" requirement, the presumption must be rebutted if
the actual buyer was unaware of the statements before
purchasing. This analysis appears unassailable. It is also com-
forting, since it solves the mystery of "basis of the bargain"
through familiar concepts of inducement and reliance which
are nothing more than elaborations of the Williston interpreta-
tion of the Sales Act.
This solution unfortunately is superficial. One must con-
front Comment 7 to section 2-313. That comment notes that the
precise time when statements of fact about the goods are made
"is not material."2 6 Rather, the sole question is whether such
affinations of fact "are fairly to be regarded as part of the con-
tract."27 Comment 7 is most clearly inconsistent with the Wil-
liston interpretation in its endorsement of postformation
warranties: 28 "If language is used after the closing of the deal
(as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an
additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modification
and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise
reasonable and in order (Section 2-209)."29 One cannot recon-
cile the inducement or reliance analysis with postformation
warranty. The seller's statement did not induce the purchase
26. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7.
27. Id.
28. If it is inconsistent with the Williston test, it is a fortiori inconsistent
with the much stricter test that requires proof of actual reliance.
29. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7.
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of the goods, nor did the buyer rely upon a statement that the
seller made only after the contract was formed. The Comment
7 test is amorphous, asking whether the statement is to be
fairly regarded as part of the contract. Yet, it does conclude
that the buyer may fairly regard the seller's statement made af-
ter the closing of the deal as part of the contract, thus sug-
gesting a novel concept of bargain, a concept well beyond and
different from a bargained-for-exchange idea involving induce-
ment or reliance.
One can illuminate this novel concept by examining not
only section 2-313 and its comments, but also related sections of
Article 1 and other sections of Article 2. As noted, Comment 7
requires a determination of what one may fairly regard as part
of the "contract." Section 1-201(11) of Article 1 defines contract
as the legal effect of "the parties' agreement." 30 Section 1-
201(3), in turn, defines agreement as "the bargain of the parties
in fact. 31
This section, the only Code reference to bargain-in-fact,
suggests that bargain-in-fact means more than bargained-for-
exchange. Section 1-201(3) suggests that it means the total
agreement of the parties. According to this section, the bar-
gain-in-fact is found by examining both the parties' language
and the implication from other circumstances. These other cir-
cumstances include course of dealing,32 usage of trade,33 and
course of performance.34 In particular, section 2-208(3), the sec-
tion governing course of performance,35 affords priority of
course of performance evidence, even over the contract's ex-
press terms. This is analogous to the postformation warranty
concept in Comment 7 to section 2-313. Therefore, under both
Comment 7 and section 2-208(3), superior evidence of the bar-
gain-in-fact will replace even the express written terms of the
deal.
The essence of Article 2 is a more precise and fair identifi-
cation of the true bargain-in-fact of the parties, unhampered by
technical notions of classical contract law. Other manifesta-
30. U.C.C. § 1-201(11).
31. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
32. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
33. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
34. See U.C.C. § 2-208.
35. U.C.C. § 2-208(3) provides, "[s]ubject to the provisions of the next sec-
tion on modification and waiver such course of performance shall be relevant to
show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of per-
formance." Note that as in Comment 7, section 2-208(3) uses the subsequent
modification device to support its priority.
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tions of this Article 2 phenomenon abound. Section 2-209, al-
lowing subsequent modifications of agreements without
consideration, 36 certainly constitutes a clear example, albeit
one which may have seemed less radical because of the tradi-
tional criticism of the pre-existing duty rule. The significant
modifications of the parol evidence rule in section 2-202, al-
lowing course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of perform-
ance to explain or supplement a written agreement, is another
clear illustration of this principle.3 7 The Code's greater flex-
ibility in determining contract formation and operative terms is
apparent in section 2-204(2), which states that "[a]n agreement
sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even
though the moment of its making is undetermined." 38
Another example of the rejection of classical, technical con-
tract law by Article 2 is the repudiation of disclaimers of ex-
press warranties in section 2-316(l).39 This section is simply
another expression of the critical comment in section 2-313,
which also rejects language disclaiming express warranties,
that the focus of that section-and all warranty law under the
U.C.C.--"is to determine what it is that the seller has in es-
sence agreed to sell .... 40 While this language is directed
principally at the refusal "except in unusual circumstances to
recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation," 41 it is
interesting that the comment emphasizes the search for what
"the seller has in essence agreed to sell," and not what the
buyer has agreed to buy. It is possible that the last phrase was
inadvertently omitted from the comment. It is more likely,
however, that it was deliberately omitted, because its inclusion
would have misled interpreters of the section to arrive at the
more familiar and narrow concept of bargained-for-exchange.
The most compelling illustrations of the principle that Arti-
cle 2 rejects traditional contract law, to search for the expanded
concept of bargain-in-fact, are the "battle of the forms" analysis
36. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) provides that "[a]n agreement modifying a contract
within this Article needs no consideration to be binding."
37. U.C.C. § 2-202 provides that a written agreement "may be explained or
supplemented (a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208)."
38. U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
39. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) states, in part, that "subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Seption 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable."
40. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 4.
41. Id.
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of section 2-20742 and the unconscionability restrictions of sec-
tion 2-302.43 Under section 2-207, clauses in the written evi-
dence of the contract are inoperative if they do not represent
the bargain-in-fact. 44 Under section 2-302, courts will similarly
not enforce certain clauses if they would unfairly surprise or
oppress one of the parties, 45 because such a surprising or op-
pressive term is not part of their bargain-in-fact. 46 Rather, it
was dictated by the superior party, and it is, therefore,
unconscionable.
The courts have encountered difficulty to a greater or
lesser extent with all of the sections mentioned above, and the
difficulty in each case is traceable to the same source: a failure
to appreciate the essence of Article 2. It is impossible to com-
prehend the expanded notion of bargain from one comment to
section 2-313. The expanded concept of bargain can only be
gleaned from an understanding of many sections of Article 2. It
is impossible to deal effectively with isolated sections and ex-
pect holdings and rationales that are consistent with the under-
lying philosophy of Article 2.
II. THE CASE LAW
When confronted with the task of adumbrating the "basis
of the bargain" in myriad fact situations, courts could have
sought guidance in familiar constructs which sound like "basis
of the bargain," constructs such as bargained-for-exchange, re-
liance, and offer and acceptance. In the alternative, courts
could have recognized that the concept of "bargain," and the
phrase "basis of the bargain," suggest a continuum, a process
which they ought not to confuse with or limit to the older, fa-
miliar concepts. The former approach is more comfortable,
while the latter requires imagination as well as an emphatic
concern for the particular facts surrounding the transaction.
There are a number of cases which do not recognize any
change in section 2-313 from the Uniform Sales Act require-
42. See generally Murray, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. Pri. L REV. 597 (1978).
43. See generally Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1969).
44. Comment 4 to U.C.C. section 2-207 states that terms that would "result
in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness" will not be
given operative effect.
45. See U.C.C. § 2-302 Comment 1. "The principle is one of the prevention
of oppression and unfair surprise...."
46. See Murray, supra note 43, at 41-43.
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ment of reliance.47 These cases blithely assume that the stan-
dard remains the same. When they consciously consider the
"part of the basis of the bargain" requirement in 2-313, there is
a remarkable confusion of thought. Thus, in Sessa v. Riegle,48
the court confronted the question of whether the seller's state-
ment, "the horse is sound," was an affirmation of fact and a po-
tential express warranty. The court decided that the statement,
under the circumstances, was mere opinion.49 Nonetheless, it
proceeded to discuss the "basis of the bargain" element of 2-
313 (1) (a):
This is essentially a reliance requirement and is inextricably inter-
twined with the initial determination as to whether given language
may constitute an express warranty since affirmations, promises and
descriptions tend to become part of the basis of the bargain. It was the
intention of the drafters of the U.C.C. not to require a strong showing
of reliance. In fact, they envisioned that all statements of the seller be-
came part of the basis of the bargain unless clear affirmative proof is
shown to the contrary.50
Ostensibly applying this test, the court decided that the seller's
(Riegle's) statement that the horse was sound was not part of
the basis of the bargain because the buyer had relied upon his
own agent (Maloney) in evaluating the horse.5 1 The court at-
tempted to clarify its decision: 'The court believes that Malo-
ney's opinion was the principal, if not the only factor which
motivated Sessa to purchase the horse. The conversation with
Riegle played a negligible role in his decision." 52
The court apparently concluded that an affirmation of fact
that motivates or induces the purchase of goods, if it is not the
principal factor, or perhaps if it is merely a negligible factor,
cannot be an express warranty. Despite requiring a reliance el-
ement, the court was willing to presume its existence because
of language in Comments 3 and 8.53 But it then insisted that
the buyer must be induced or motivated to purchase the goods
47. See, e.g., Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967);
Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affid, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978);
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On-Tools, 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Downs v. Shouse,
18 Ariz. App. 225, 501 P.2d 401 (1972); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau
Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 244 N.W.2d 105 (1976); Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp.,
533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1976); General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490
S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
48. 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978).
49. 427 F. Supp. at 765.
50. Id. at 766.
51. '"The evidence shows, however, that Sessa was relying primarily on
Maloney to advise him in connection with the sale." Id.
52. Id. at 767.
53. See id. at 766.
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principally as a result of the statement of the seller.5 4 If the
court meant that the buyer must prove actual inducement, the
test is more difficult for the buyer than the Williston test under
the Uniform Sales Act, which only requires that the seller's
statements naturally induce the buyer to purchase the goods. 55
If the court meant that not only an actual buyer, but a reason-
able buyer, would not have been motivated or induced to
purchase by the seller's statements, it applied a test indistin-
guishable from the Williston test. Moreover, since the Williston
"natural inducement" test was designed to meet the reliance
requirement of the Sales Act, the court in its confusion applied,
in essence, a reliance test.
In Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co.,56 the
court cited Sessa with approval,5 7 although it began its discus-
sion of the seller's argument that the samples involved were
not express warranties with the unambiguous statement,
JR] eliance is not the test under the Uniform Commercial Code.
.... Although this question has not been passed on in Texas, the
weight of authority does not require reliance as an element to recover
on an express warranty ... A finding that the sample is part of the ba-
sis of the bargain... incorporates the reliance requirement to some ex-
tent .... We conclude, therefore, that a separate issue on reliance is
improper to establish an express warranty by sample or model.5 8
Acquiescing in the "weight of authority,"59 the court decided
that reliance is not an element in establishing an express
warranty.
The court, however, retreated from this clear stand. De-
spite ostensibly eschewing a reliance requirement, it simply in-
54. Id.
55. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text. The Williston test for
express warranties is reminiscent of the Williston test for parol evidence. The
latter test directs courts to determine if they will admit parol evidence by com-
paring the extrinsic oral agreement with the written agreement and determin-
ing "whether parties, situated as were the ones to the contract, would naturally
and normally include the one in the other if it were made." 4 S. WLLiSTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAcTs § 638 (3d ed. 1961). In both tests, the trier
of fact is more concerned that the statements naturally tend to induce a rea-
sonable buyer-party rather than the actual buyer-party.
56. 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
57. Id. at 293.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. The only authority that the Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory court cited for
the proposition that the weight of authority does not require a reliance require-
ment to recover on an express warranty was section 2-313:18 of IL Anderson's
book, Uniform Commercial Code. While it is true that Anderson does state that
reliance is unnecessary, his analysis of express warranty is not internally con-
sistent. Anderson's analysis as a whole suggests that reliance is still an ex-
press warranty requirement. See &. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 2-313:10, 2-313:11, 2-313:26, 2-313:37, 2-313:42 (2d ed. 1970).
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verted the requirement of the element by making "lack of
reliance" the test.6 0 Lack of reliance became an "inferential re-
buttal" to the basis of the bargain requirement.61 If the seller
proved a lack of reliance, the seller was entitled to a jury in-
struction.62 The court clearly intended to make reliance an ele-
ment in determining the existence of an express warranty,
although it incorporated it in the form of a presumption of reli-
ance that the seller could rebut by proving that the buyer
neither heard the seller's statement nor saw the seller's
samples.
Perhaps the court was confounded by its own illustration:
a buyer who knows that a representation by the seller is untrue
may not treat that representation as part of the basis of the
bargain.6 3 The court assumed that the only rationale for this
conclusion was a lack of reliance. There is, however, an alter-
nate rationale. Consider two examples. First, suppose a seller
has made a unilateral mistake in his representation and the
buyer knows or should know that the seller is making that mis-
take. The representation should not amount to an express war-
ranty any more than an offeree should be able to "snap up" an
offer if the offeree knows or should know the offeror has made a
mistake.64 An offeree should know that the offeror does not in-
tend to create a power of acceptance with respect to the mis-
take in the purported offer. Therefore, the offeree has no
expectation that the goods will reflect the seller's representa-
tion.65 Second, suppose that statements otherwise manifesting
express warranties are made to an expert buyer about equip-
ment which the buyer examines and, through such examina-
60. "Obviously, if the buyer knows that a representation of the seller is un-
true, that representation cannot be a part of the basis of the bargain. Thus, a
lack of reliance precludes a sample or model from creating an express war-
ranty." 602 S.W.2d at 293 (citing Sessa and other authorities).
61. Id. at 293-94. The court stated that
[i]n some instances a jury instruction on lack of reliance may be ger-
mane to the 'basis of the bargain' issue. If it is, it must take the form of
an instruction rather than a defensive issue on lack of reliance because
lack of reliance is an inferential rebuttal to the 'basis of the bargain' el-
ement of the plaintiff's recovery.
62. Id. The court stated that
[the Code places] the burden on the seller to prove that affirmations of
fact or samples or models are not a part of the basis of the bargain.
Thus, only after the seller has introduced proof of the lack of the
buyer's reliance on the sample is the seller entitled to a reliance
instruction.
63. See note 60 supra.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981).
65. For a more detailed analysis of the expectation aspect of express war-
ranties, see notes 205-31 infra and accompanying text.
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tion, knows or should know that the statements of the seller
are untrue. The buyer has no expectation that the statements
reflect the quality of the goods. In both examples, the state-
ments are not part of the contract. It is as if the seller with-
drew the statements prior to the closing of the deal. To suggest
that there is no reasonable reliance by the buyers is a truism.
The argument that the agreement of the parties-their bargain-
in-fact--does not include such statements because the buyer's
knowledge forecloses any such expectation is a more persua-
sive rationale.
Other recent cases concerned with structuring an effective
test under section 2-313 also avoid the central questions. In Ew-
ers v. Eisenzopf,66 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin began its
analysis of the 'part of the basis of the bargain" puzzle by hold-
ing that the seller's affirmation need only be a factor in the
purchase and not the sole basis for the sale.67 Then, relying on
Pritchard v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co.,68 which the Wiscon-
sin court read as concluding that the seller's intent and buyer's
reliance are irrelevant in creating an express warranty, the
court adopted Pritchard's "workable test."69 'The true test is
not whether the seller actually intended to be bound by his
statement but rather whether he made an affirmation of fact the
natural tendency of which was to induce the sale and which did
in fact induce it."70
This test is clearly indistinguishable from the Williston test
of reliance under the Uniform Sales Act.7 1 The Ewers court ap-
parently believed, however, that it was adopting a new test, one
that eschewed a reliance test and met the new standard of "ba-
sis of the bargain" in section 2-313. By adopting a "natural in-
ducement" standard,7 2 the court not only unwittingly adopted a
pre-Code test, but failed to consider the expansive scope of bar-
gain-in-fact which section 2-313 demands.73 The failure of the
adopted test to meet the requirements of 2-313 is not immedi-
ately visible in this case since, as in many cases, one can say
66. 88 Wis. 2d 482, 276 N.W.2d 802 (1979).
67. Id. at 488, 276 N.W.2d at 805.
68. 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965).
69. Interestingly, Pritchard dealt with the provisions of Pennsylvania's ad-
aptation of the Uniform Sales Act § 12, not the U.C.C.
70. Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 88 Wis. at 489, 276 N.W.2d at 805.
71. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
72. For other cases which adhere to a "natural inducement" standard, see
Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Hel v. Standard
Chem. Mfg. Co., 301 Minn. 315, 223 N.W.2d 37 (1976); Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
73. See notes 32-46 supra and accompanying text.
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that the particular statement of the seller induced the buyer to
buy just as one can say that the buyer relied, or could have rea-
sonably relied, upon the seller's statement. It is much easier to
recognize the inadequacy of such a test where there is no reli-
ance and no inducement, if, for example, a court is confronted
with a seller's postformation statement relating to the goods.
In Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc.,74 the buyer
and seller met on September 8, 1975, to discuss the purchase
and sale of a used boat. At this meeting they agreed to a total
purchase price of $100,000, with a down payment of $20,000 that
would be paid at the time of transfer of possession. The seller's
representative, Mr. Love, volunteered to have a survey made of
the boat, that is, have an expert examine the boat to determine
its condition. The buyer had not requested any survey and told
Love that it would be unnecessary. Love replied that he would
like to have one made anyway, at his own expense. The survey
was made on September 10, and the purchaser first saw the re-
sults on September 12. The survey concluded that the boat was
excellently constructed, and that the vessel was clean, dry, and
well ventilated.75 The buyer gave Love the $20,000 down pay-
ment and took possession of the boat the same day. The buyer
later discovered "an enormous amount of dry rot and insect in-
festation."76 In his suit, the buyer claimed breach of an express
warranty by description, based upon the September 10 survey.
The Supreme Court of Oregon rejected the seller's argu-
ment that the survey was not part of the basis of the bargain
because the contract for the sale of the boat had occurred on
September 8 and the survey did not occur until after formation
of the contract. Although it ruled that a contract had been
formed on September 8, the court, relying upon the analysis of
Professor Robert Nordstrom,77 distinguished a "bargain" and a
"contract." Under that analysis a "bargain" does not occur at a
particular moment in time, but is a process which describes the
overall commercial relationship between the parties in regard
to the product. While the parties had agreed upon the
purchase price of the boat on September 8, other details re-
mained to be settled such as time of payment and transfer of
possession. Thus, "[t]he bargain was still in process."7 8 This
74. 280 Or. 783, 572 P.2d 1322 (1977).
75. Id. at 788, 572 P.2d at 1325.
76. Id. at 787, 572 P.2d at 1324.
77. See R NoRDsTRoM, supra note 11, at § 67. For a detailed discussion of
Nordstrom's analysis, see notes 183-204 infra and accompanying text.
78. 280 Or. at 787, 572 P.2d at 1325.
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analysis seems to correspond with this Article's interpretation
of "basis of the bargain," but the court intimated that it might
deviate from this line of thought.
While this description [the survey] did not induce the actual formation
of the contract, the jury might have found that it did induce and was
intended by the Seller to induce Buyer's satisfaction with the agree-
ment just made, as well as to lessen Buyer's degree of vigilance in in-
specting the boat prior to acceptance.
7 9
If this were the extent of the court's analysis, it would be
consistent with statements of inducement or even reliance
found in other section 2-313 cases. Though the survey did not
induce the buyer to purchase the boat, it may have induced the
buyer to forgo normal inspection of the boat. Forebearing nor-
mal inspection could affect a buyer's right of rejection under
section 2-601.80 Since the court held that the survey was an ex-
press warranty8' it did not consider whether the buyer would
have had the right to reject absent the survey,82 nor did it con-
sider the existence of other alleged express warranties. 83 The
court, however, suggested a test which it believed eliminated
any reliance or inducement test:
Seller additionally argues that the Huhta survey cannot be a part of the
basis of the bargain because when Love volunteered to have the survey
made, Buyer indicated it would not be necessary. What was once a
matter of indifference to the Buyer, Seller argues, cannot retrospec-
tively be transformed into an essential part of the bargain. Seller em-
phasizes that nothing in the evidence suggests that Buyer bargained
for the survey. The basis of the bargain requirement, however, does
not mean that a description by the Seller must have been bargained
for. Instead, the description must go to the essence of the contract.8 4
Since the buyer was both unaware of and indifferent to the
survey prior to the contract formation, the buyer clearly did not
rely upon the survey in agreeing to purchase the boat. More-
over, although the court earlier suggested a possible induce-
ment of the buyer with respect to buyer's right to reject, its test
clearly did not equate "bargain" as used in section 2-313 with
79. Id. at 790, 572 P.2d at 1326.
80. The buyer has a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods under
section 2-513 (absent a contrary agreement) to permit the exercise of the right
of rejection under section 2-601. If the buyer forebears inspection and the rea-
sonable time for such inspection expires, the buyer has accepted the goods
under section 2-606(1) (b).
81. 280 Or. at 788, 572 P.2d at 1326.
82. Presumably, under U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (b) the buyer could have revoked
his acceptance.
83. The buyer alleged that the original manufacturer's booklet describing
the boat when new, an earlier survey, and Love's statement that the boat was
in "A-I" condition were all express warranties. 280 Or. at 786, 572 P.2d at 1324.
84. Id. at 790, 572 P.2d at 1326.
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the classical concept of inducement found in the bargained-for-
exchange element of consideration.
Rather, the court's new test requires the statement to go to
the essence of the contract. The court concluded that the exist-
ence of an express warranty is a question for the jury.8 5 The
jury presumably should, therefore, be instructed pursuant to
the "essence" test. In light of the perplexity that courts mani-
fest in attempting to decipher "basis of the bargain" it may
have been inevitable that a court would resort to metaphysics
to describe this requirement. The court does not attempt any
further description of the "essence" test. This is not surprising
since the term suggests an ineffable quality. One can probably
do no better than suggest a common dictionary definition of
"true substance."86 Although this definition is compatible with
certain Article 2 sections which direct the search toward the
"true agreement" of the parties,87 it is not very helpful.
The last glimmer of hope is found in the court's citation of
Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equipment Enterprises, Inc.88
as authority for the "essence" test.8 9 In Alan Wood, the de-
fendant seller sold a crane to the plaintiff buyer that did not
meet the seller's specifications.90 The seller, however, in its
representations to the buyer, stated that its descriptions were
only approximate and clearly sold the crane "as inspected by
the buyer."91 The trial court found for the seller.92 On appeal,
85. Id.
86. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 777 (3d ed. 1961).
87. See notes 36-46 supra and accompanying text.
88. 39 IlM. App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976).
89. See Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. at 790, 572 P.2d
at 1326.
90. The seller described the crane as a 75 ton locomotive crane with a 40
foot boom. Several months after receipt of the crane, Wood discovered that the
maximum lifting capacity was only 50 tons rather than 75 tons. Blueprints indi-
cated that when originally manufactured, the crane was equipped with a
curved boom which allowed it to lift 75 tons. That boom, however, had been
inexplicably replaced with a straight boom which lowered the lifting capacity to
50 tons. 39 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 349 N.E.2d at 631-32.
91. The seller's "format quotation" contained printed terms captioned
"Conditions" which read, in pertinent part: "All equipment is subject to inspec-
tion and the descriptions are approximate and intended to serve as a guide."
Id. at 50, 349 N.E.2d at 630. After receipt of the quotation, a crane operator from
Wood inspected the crane in Chicago. Wood then sent its purchase order and
acknowledgment form to Capital. Capital's representative signed the Wood ac-
knowledgment form, but added the following typewritten statement: "Accepted
subject to modifications contained in our letter dated 2/23/66 attached." Id. at
51, 349 N.E.2d at 631. The Capital letter contained four modifications of the
terms in the Wood acknowledgment, the fourth of which read as follows: 'The
crane is offered and sold without warranties either express or implied, and in
effect sold as inspected before shipment." Id.
92. Id. at 49, 349 N.E.2d at 629.
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the court attempted to describe the "basis of the bargain" test
in section 2-313 by relying upon Comments 1 and 4. It defined
express warranties as "contractual in nature," since Comment
1 stated that "'[e] xpress' warranties rest upon 'dickered' terms
of the individual bargain .... ,,93 Continuing with Comment 1
language, the court concluded, "[t]he 'basis of the bargain' test
focuses upon the descriptions or affirmations which clearly go
to the essence, or the basic assumption, of the bargain between
the parties."94
While Comments 1 and 4 mention the "essence" of the bar-
gain, or what the seller has "in essence agreed to sell," neither
section 2-313 nor the comments mention "basic assumption."
That phrase is found in the commercial impracticability sec-
tion.95 It is not only absent from the critical U.C.C. section, it is
also a test which Professor Honnold had rejected for determin-
ing the "basis of the bargain," since it would be even narrower
than the Uniform Sales Act test.96
Comment 1 does speak of "dickered terms." In another
context, Karl Llewellyn suggested "dickered terms" were terms
to which the parties have consciously adverted.9 7 If express
warranties must comply with this meaning of "dickered terms,"
the Code would recognize significantly fewer express warran-
ties than its predecessor had recognized. Three arguments dis-
pute this interpretation. First, Comment 1 is designed to
compare express warranties with implied warranties. The
93. Id. at 53, 349 N.E.2d at 632.
94. Id.
95. See U.C.C. § 2-615. That section provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in pa t by a seller
who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable
foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or
not it later proves to be invalid.
96. Professor Honnold noted that the "basic assumption" test would radi-
cally restrict the scope, under the Uniform Sales Act, of a buyer's warranty pro-
tection. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT OF THE LAw
REvISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFOM COMMERCIAL CODE 392-
93 (1955).




phrase "dickered terms" is arguably an imprecise communica-
tion of "express terms," which may have been rejected on the
basis that one should avoid circular definitions. Second, in his
well-known exegesis on "dickered terms," Llewellyn recognized
not only "specific assent" to such terms, but also "blanket as-
sent" to any reasonable or decent undickered terms.98 Finally,
the language of section 2-313 and all of the comments suggest
an expansion of the express warranty concept over the Uniform
Sales Act.99 Almost no court or commentator has urged a con-
struction that would diminish express warranty protection
under the Code to a narrower scope than the Sales Act.100
Thus, the essence test, adopted by the Oregon court in Autzen,
and defined by the Illinois court in Alan Wood, does not ade-
quately explain the meaning of "basis of the bargain," although
the Illinois court was justified in resorting to comment lan-
guage in its attempt.' 0 '
Of even greater importance was the Alan Wood court's de-
termination that although reliance may be of some significance
in determining the bargain or agreement of the parties, it is not
the sole criterion.102 Considering all of the evidence, the court
found no express warranty since the buyer assumed all of the
risk in the purchase of the crane.10 3 The court recognized that
Comment 3 does not require particular reliance to create an ex-
press warranty. 0 4 It also recognized, however, the "prevailing
98. Id.
99. See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text.
100. The only commentator who has argued that the U.C.C. warranty sec-
tion is more narrow than the Sales Act is Mitchell Ezer. See Ezer, Impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales in Warranties, 8
U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 281, 287-88 (1961). Ezer argued that under section 2-313(1) the
seller must make a promise or affirmation to the buyer to create an express
warranty. The Sales Act required only reliance by the buyer. Therefore, ac-
cording to this analysis, the fact that the affirmation was not made to the buyer
in a face to face situation created no express warranty under the U.C.C. Ezer
urged that the words "whether directly or indirectly" be inserted. Id. at 288 n.
46.
101. The Wood court made a valid attempt to elaborate the meaning of "es-
sence of the bargain." It found the sole reference to "bargain" in the Article 1
definition of "agreement" and justified its effort as follows:
This definitional framework is important to our inquiry as to whether
the terms of the parties' contract give rise to an express warranty. In
accord is pre-code [sic] case law which holds that the existence of an
express warranty is to be determined by examining the intent of the
parties as expressed by the language of their contract, when read in
light of surrounding circumstances.
39 11. App. 3d at 54 349 N.E.2d at 633.
102. Id. at 57, 349 N.E.2d at 635.
103. Id. at 58, 349 N.E.2d at 636.
104. Id. at 57, 349 N.E.2d at 635.
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case law" view that significant reliance by the purchaser on his
or her own examination of the product before the formation of
the contract indicates the buyer's lack of reliance on the
seller's statements.105 At this point, the court could have re-
duced the basis of its holding to the narrow rationale that the
seller showed the buyer's "lack of reliance." The court, how-
ever, expressly rejected that test and concluded that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the arrangement of both inspections
and Alan Wood's subsequent reliance on its experts' opinions
further illustrates that Capital's description of the used crane
was not included as part of the "basis of the bargain."' 06 More-
over, the court's final statement suggested a different test: "In
sum, we must give effect to the terms of the contract as formed
by the parties .... Alan Wood's expectations cannot be ex-
tended beyond the terms and nature of the parties' agree-
ment."' 07 The willingness of the court to consider an expansive
meaning of "basis of the bargain" premised on the concept of
"agreement" or "bargain-in-fact" of the parties is a promising
start toward a meaningful understanding of the mysterious
phrase.
Having decided that the seller's description was not part of
the basis of the bargain, the court unfortunately held that the
seller's disclaimer of express warranty was valid, 0 8 thus ensur-
ing that the seller would not be liable. Disclaimer clauses are
anathema to the express warranty section.109 A holding that
the disclaimer clause was effective was unnecessary since
there was no express warranty to be disclaimed. The parties
simply never agreed that the goods would meet the quality
standard in the seller's statement of fact. These cases may in-
volve factual determinations which can be difficult. In some
cases it may be impossible for the seller to prove either that he
or she withdrew the statement or that the buyer knew or
should have known that the statement was untrue. Courts
should not shrink, however, from recognizing that the problem
is to determine whether the statement of fact relating to the
goods is part of the agreement rather than whether a dis-
claimer of warranty is effective.
In United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.,110
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 58, 349 N.E.2d at 636 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
110. 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975).
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the court similarly based its opinion on a disclaimer clause.
The seller in Fibres stated in its contract that it would furnish
equipment that would produce resinated cotton pads with a
thickness tolerance of 1/32 inch."l' The contract, however, also
included a disclaimer of warranty1 2 in light of the seller's inex-
perience in making such equipment."13 The court concluded
that "this descriptive language was not 'part of the basis of the
bargain.'"114 It unfortunately proceeded to give effect to the
disclaimer of warranty." 5
The court correctly determined that the language describ-
ing the 1/32 inch tolerance did not become part of the basis of
the bargain. The machinery had not been sold by specification
alone. There was compelling evidence that the parties were at-
tempting to put together a combination of machinery to fabri-
cate a product by an "unproven process." The general manager
of the buyer was fully aware of the variables involved, so the
buyer never expected the seller to produce a perfectly con-
forming machine.116 Thus, a factual statement in the descrip-
tion of the goods, which on its face appears to be an express
warranty, is not an express warranty because the bargain-in-
fact of the parties is not limited to that description. Under the
U.C.C., a bargain-in-fact includes all the circumstances sur-
rounding an agreement. These circumstances clearly indicate
that the parties did not intend the description to be literal. It
was merely a target or goal which the parties hoped to achieve.
111. Id. at 1045. Another provision stated that "the Company's standard
warranty outlined later in this contract does apply." Id. The standard war-
ranty clause printed in the contract forms read in part: "The Company war-
rants the machine against defects in materials and workmanship, but makes no
other warranties, express or implied ... unless the word 'guarantee' is used."
Id.
112. The contract consisted of two documents. Both writings, prior to the
description of the goods, contained typewritten portions captioned "PER-
FORMANCE" that state& "[I]n view of the variables present effecting (sic)
the capacity of the machine, no guarantee can be extended." Id. Moreover, the
seller argued that since the clause that described the ability of the equipment
to meet the 1/32 inch limit did not use the term "guarantee," the clause could
not be a warranty. See note 111 supra.
113. The defendant seller had never made equipment to produce these cot-
ton pads. Additionally, the buyer was buying machinery to be used as an inte-
gral part of a process never before commercially operated. See United States
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
114. 509 F.2d at 1046.
115. It approved the trial court's reliance on the disclaimer of warranty. Id.
116. The appellate court pointed out that "there is substantial evidence that
the executives of Fibres [the buyer] ... never expected [the seller] to produce
finished pads having a thickness tolerance of '1/32 inch across their width."'
Id.
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The trial court reached this conclusion through a factual deter-
mination, and the appellate review of that factual determina-
tion proceeded unhampered by narrow notions of "reliance,"
"inducement," or other classical notions which have impeded
courts in determining whether an express warranty exists. Un-
fortunately, the court did not limit its holding to the simple, but
precise, determination that the "descriptive language was not
'part of the basis of the bargain.' "11v
The affirmation of the lower court holding that the dis-
claimer was effective has several unfortunate ramifications.
The holding was clearly superfluous since the court had al-
ready concluded that the descriptive language was not an ex-
press warranty. The only possible operative effect of the
disclaimer was to disclaim express warranties. Since descrip-
tive language was held not to constitute an express warranty,
the disclaimer had nothing on which to operate. The descrip-
tive language giving the 1/32 inch tolerance specification was
not effective because it was not part of the basis of the bargain.
It did not become ineffective because it was disclaimed. Some
commentators unfortunately view the case as an illustration of
an effective disclaimer of an express warranty."18
Moreover, the appellate court's conclusion that the dis-
claimer of express warranties was consistent with the descrip-
tive language and that, therefore, the disclaimer was effective
under U.C.C. section 2-316(1) is patently wrong.119 Once a
court determines that a seller's statement becomes part of the
basis of the bargain, it is not possible to disclaim that express
warranty. The original (1952) draft of section 2-316(1) explicitly
made any attempt to disclaim express warranties inopera-
tive.120 This apparently appeared to be too radical. Therefore,
the current familiar version of section 2-316(1) was substi-
tuted.121 This version permits express warranties and disclaim-
ers of express warranties to co-exist. When, however, it would
117. Id.
118. See J. WH'rE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 431-33.
119. According to the appellate court, "the district court correctly deter-
mined that the language which excluded an express warranty was not inconsis-
tent with the language of description, UCC § 2-316(1), and gave it effect." 509
F.2d at 1046.
120. "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it
are inoperative." U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1952 version).
121. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject
to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section
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be unreasonable to construe these terms as consistent, the dis-
claimer is inoperative. The compelling conclusion is that ex-
press warranties cannot also be disclaimed under the current
version. It will be necessary for a court to determine whether
an express warranty exists, as did the court in Fibres. If the
court concludes that it does exist, any clause limiting or negat-
ing the effect of express warranties will not apply to the state-
ment of fact that the buyer claims is an express warranty
because it is superfluous.122
A summary of the case law adumbration of "basis of the
bargain" reveals mass confusion and little assistance. It would
be less than accurate to characterize the case law as manifest-
ing a split of authority between those cases which insist upon a
showing of reliance and those which reject that requirement.
The confusion is much deeper. As illustrated in this review of
the cases, some courts initially state that reliance is required,
only to later suggest that in fact it is not or may not be re-
quired.123 Other courts initially state that reliance is not re-
quired, but proceed to suggest that it is required, either
expressly or through some kind of inducement.124 Moreover,
these cases may very well cite each other as authority.1 25
There is little or no understanding of the overlap between reli-
ance and inducement. There is virtually no understanding of
the Sales Act test of Williston and some courts mistakenly em-
ploy it as a "new" test for determining the basis of the bargain.
Finally, the few courts which see the need for a genuinely new
2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such con-
struction is unreasonable.
122. To complete the analysis, the parol evidence limitation of the recogni-
tion of express warranties in section 2-316(1) does not operate as a disclaimer
of express warranties. The Code parol evidence rule is designed to effectuate
the true understanding of the parties of their agreement. See Murray, The Pa-
rol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342, 1385-1387 (1975). The rule is to-
tally consistent with the quintessential search for the bargain-in-fact of the par-
ties. If the parties intended their written expression of agreement to be the
sole and exclusive repository of their bargain, it will be given that effect.
Therefore, no statement of fact relating to the goods prior to that writing will be
part of that bargain. It will not be considered an express warranty.
123. See note 47 supra.
124. See, e.g., Young & Copper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281
(1974); Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp, 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Civ. App. 1976); In-
dust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980); Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 88 Wis. 2d 482, 276 N.W.2d 802 (1979).
125. See, e.g., Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d at
293 (citing Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affid, 568 F.2d 770
(3rd Cir. 1978)).
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test fail to articulate one.126
IV. THE COMMENTATORS
A. THE WIrE AND SUMMERS ANALYSIS
The most recent text on the Code is the second edition of
White and Summers's Uniform Commercial Code.127 The sec-
tion dealing with "basis of the bargain" is unchanged from the
first edition except for some additional cases and authority.128
It is important to consider this volume's explanation of the
cryptic phrase since the White and Summers work is justifiably
regarded as generally sound and reliable. In keeping with their
exploration of other difficult sections of the Code, the authors
warn the reader that the phrase remains unclear.129 They do
not pretend to suggest a solution to the mystery. Instead, they
suggest that the drafters may have intended to leave the ex-
isting law and its reliance requirement intact, or they may have
intended to remove a reliance requirement except in the most
unusual case, or, finally, they may have merely intended to pro-
vide the plaintiff with the benefit of a rebuttable presump-
tion.130 The authors choose the last alternative.' 3 ' Even that
choice is made with some reluctance, however, since they es-
sentially find themselves in the position of Professor Honnold,
who expressed his views on the new Code for the New York
State Law Revision Commission.132 Honnold did not believe
that one could assume, with confidence, that the "basis of the
bargain" test simply incorporated a pre-Code reliance test,
since the Code phrase does not convey any definite meaning
and the apparent express rejection of the reliance language
could signal an intent to modify the pre-Code standard.133 Al-
though Comment 3, which states that "no particular reliance on
such statements need be shown,"' 34 drives White and Sum-
mers to suggest that a plaintiff could "likely" meet the basis of
the bargain test without any proof of buyer's reliance, they cau-
tion that a careful lawyer will allege some reliance and offer
126. See, e.g., Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter. Inc., 39 Ml. App.
3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976); Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280
Or. 783, 572 P.2d 1322 (1977).
127. J. WorrE & L SUMMERs, supra note 3.
128. See id. at 332.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 334-35.
132. See note 96 supra.
133. Id.




White and Summers then attack some of the difficult com-
ment language. Since Comment 3 refers to affirmations of fact
made "during a bargain,"'136 they wonder whether any adver-
tisement would qualify for the presumption that the seller's
statement constituted an express warranty. 137 The authors
conclude that notwithstanding the phrase "during a bargain" in
Comment 3, advertisements containing such affirmations of fact
can be a "part of the basis of the bargain, and it is only fair that
it be so."138 They feel compelled, however, to add the require-
ment that a plaintiff or his agent must have known of, and re-
lied upon, the advertisement in making the purchase.139 In this
circumstance, that is the "minimum" proof necessary to sup-
port a finding for the plaintiff.140
The authors apparently distinguish this burden from a
lighter burden they would suggest for a plaintiff alleging an ex-
press warranty based upon a seller's statement made "during a
bargain."141 This is a difficult distinction, having no support in
Comment 3 or in any other comment or section language.
Moreover, it suggests one of the classical contract approaches
to the meaning of "bargain." By insisting upon knowledge on
the part of the buyer or his agent, it suggests that a buyer
somehow must know of and "accept" a seller's statement relat-
ing to the goods just as an offeree must know of and accept an
offer. White and Summers appear to base their insistence of a
showing of reliance on the notion that reliance is similar to the
bargained-for-exchange idea, which requires at least induce-
ment reliance.
This view is difficult to reconcile with express warranties
made after the sale has been concluded. Although the authors
believe that "[o1 ne may argue most persuasively that once a le-
135. J. WirrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 335.
136. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 3.
137. J. WrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 335.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 335-36. They expressly approve a Missouri case cautioning that
any such affirmation must have at least been read since "the UCC requires the
proposed express warranty be part of the basis of the bargain." Interco Inc. v.
Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1976). Although the court, in
the portion of the opinion quoted by the authors, does not expressly require re-
liance as well as knowledge of the advertisement by the purchaser, the authors
require both knowledge and reliance. J. W=T & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at
336.
140. Id.
141. Id. The authors make this distinction because "[i]n the usual case one
would not regard an advertisement as being made 'during a bargain.' Id.
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gally binding contract of sale exists, no additional statements of
the seller can be made part of the basis of that bargain,"142 they
recognize that they must come to grips with Comment 7.143
They seek to justify postformation warranties when logically
reliance is impossible after the deal is closed. "To that argu-
ment one may respond that in the merchandising world a
buyer, even one already legally obligated to buy, has greater
rights while he is still standing at the seller's counter than he
does two weeks later."' 44 In an explanatory footnote support-
ing this statement, the authors remind the reader that once
goods are accepted, the buyer's 2-601 right to reject no longer
exists.14S Since rejection must occur within a reasonable time
after the delivery or tender of goods, a failure to reject within
that time constitutes acceptance. 46 While the buyer may,
under certain conditions, revoke acceptance of the goods, there
is a reasonable time limitation upon such a revocation. 47
There is a strong temptation to demur to this explanation.
If the authors mean that a buyer has a right to reject the goods
immediately after the sale, and that right continues until the
reasonable time for rejection expires, one cannot argue with
that truism.148 Yet this explanation still does not seem to an-
swer how a postformation warranty can adversely affect the
right of rejection, thus justifying the recognition of these
postformation warranties. To satisfy this question, the authors
suggest an example of a camper who purchases a sleeping bag
advertised as suitable for winter use. Immediately after paying
the purchase price, the seller tells the buyer that the bag can
be used in sub-zero temperatures. Relying upon that state-
ment, the camper uses the bag in sub-zero temperatures and
suffers frostbite. The denouement is fascinating:
[A]fter the camper has used the bag in reliance on the seller's state-
ment, the bag will have acquired some holes and a great deal of mud,
and the seller will be far less willing to rescind. In these circumstances
it would seem reasonable to make the seller's post-sale statement an
express warranty. 14 9
Apparently, the authors are attempting to illustrate that
142. Id. at 336-37.
143. Id. See U.C.C. 2-313 Comment 7. For a discussion of Comment 7, see
notes 26-35 supra and accompanying text.
144. J. WE=rr & R. SumMERs, supra note 3, at 337.
145. Id. at 337 nA3.
146. Id.
147. U.C.C. § 2-608.
148. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
149. J. WHmrn & IL SuMmERs, supra note 3, at 337.
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the buyer relied on the seller's postformation statement, thus
affecting the buyer's right of rejection. This analysis is faulty.
If the inability of the sleeping bag to withstand sub-zero tem-
peratures causes it not to conform to the original contract as
found in the advertisement,5 0 the buyer has a right to reject
the sleeping bag.'5 ' This right of rejection lasts at least until
the buyer first uses the bag, enabling the buyer to discover its
defect.152 Although this use may make the bag dirty and full of
holes, causing the seller to be unwilling to rescind, the buyer
has an incontestable right to reject. On the other hand, if the
inability of the sleeping bag to withstand sub-zero tempera-
tures does not make it nonconforming, the buyer has no right
to reject it regardless of the seller's postformation warranty
statement. Either way, the seller's postformation warranty
statement does not adversely affect the buyer's right of rejec-
tion. Admittedly, there are particular cases where the seller's
postformation statements can affect a right of rejection.153 Yet,
even in these few cases, a buyer might be able to revoke ac-
ceptance under U.C.C. section 2-608.154
The White and Summers example is unfortunate in one
last respect. If the seller made a statement of fact about the
use of the bag in sub-zero temperatures and the buyer relied
150. "Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 'con-
forming' or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obli-
gations under the contract." U.C.C. §2-106(2). A sleeping bag advertised as
"suitable for winter use" which was not effective in sub-zero temperatures
could arguably not be in accordance with the terms of this contract.
151. U.C.C. § 2-601.
152. White and Summers would clearly permit the typical purchaser of
such an item to reject it after the first opportunity to use it, since the reason-
able time to reject incorporates the time necessary for inspection. "Although 2-
602 [Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection] does not make explicit reference
to the difficulty of discovery, the comments, the statutory history, and the cases
suggest that that factor is equally relevant there." J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 3, at 310. White and Summers also cite Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-602.
"The sections of this article dealing with inspection of goods must be read in
connection with the buyer's reasonable time for action under this subsection."
Id. at 310 n.46. This view is certainly correct. Absent unusual expertise, the
typical buyer of a sleeping bag would discover the defect only after awakening
with frostbite. Even if the sale had occurred months before, the right to reject
would exist. Clearly this rejection would be within a reasonable time. U.C.C.
section 2-602(1) would be the authority for the rejection.
153. For example, in Autzen the seller's statement could have induced the
buyer not to conduct a normal inspection and, therefore, foreclosed the buyer's
possible right to reject. See text accompanying notes 74-86 supra. Under
U.C.C. section 2-606(1) (b), if the buyer fails to inspect the goods after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to do so, he has accepted the goods.
154. Under U.C.C. section 2-608 the elements of revocation of acceptance are
(1) the subjective test of substantial impairment to the buyer and (2) that ac-
ceptance was induced by the "difficulty of discovery" of the defects.
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upon that statement and suffered frostbite, the postformation
warranty concept of Comment 7 is unnecessary to permit re-
covery. The actual reliance by the purchaser upon such a
statement and the seller's liability would be recognized out-
side the Code under tort law as the authors subsequently
suggest.155
Hence, the authors' explanation of Comment 7, that
postformation warranties should be express warranties be-
cause of the buyer's reliance on the seller's statement and the
resulting adverse effect on the buyer's right of rejection, is not
convincing. To properly understand Comment 7, one must real-
ize that the U.C.C. describes an expanded notion of basis of the
bargain. The basis of the bargain is not limited to the tradi-
tional law of contracts, nor is it restricted to situations involv-
ing inducement or reliance. White and Summers further reveal
their misunderstanding of these precepts in the particularly
narrow scope they give to postformation warranties.
The authors require that postformation warranties be bilat-
eral.156 They may have thought that Comment 7 supported this
view in three respects. First, the test set forth in Comment 7 is
"whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be re-
garded as part of the contract.15 7 Although this may suggest a
"bilateral" connotation absent the Code, the definition of "con-
tract" is merely the legal effect given to the "agreement" of the
parties.SB The agreement of the parties, in turn, is the parties'
bargain-in-fact, which extends beyond the bounds of a tradi-
tional "contract." 5 9 Second, Comment 7 suggests that
postformation warranties must comply with section 2-209 on
subsequent modifications. White and Summers may have re-
garded the reference to agreement in 2-209160 as describing a bi-
lateral contract instead of the more expansive definition of
"agreement" in section 1-201(3).161 Finally, Comment 7 con-
tains a parenthetical illustration: "(as when the buyer when
155. J. W'rrE & R. SummERs, supra note 3, at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402B (1969)).
156. J. WBrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 338.
157. U.C.C § 2-313 Comment 7 (emphasis added).
158. U.C.C § 1-201(3) states: "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties
in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance ......
159. See notes 26-46 supra and accompanying text.
160. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) provides: "An agreement modifying a contract within
this article needs no consideration to be binding." White and Summers be-
lieved that an agreement of modification had a "bilateral connotation." J.
WmrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 3, at 338.
161. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance)."162
Certainly, this illustration suggests a bilateral connotation.
Yet, there is no suggestion that the expression is anything
more than illustrative.
The same illustration is apparently the basis for additional
restrictions which the authors place upon such a warranty.
They say that the comment seems to contemplate only "face-to-
face dealings that occur while the deal is still warm. 1 63 It
taxes credulity to suggest that the parties could not enter into a
subsequent modification amounting to an express warranty by
mail or telephone. In fact, such suggestion is clearly contrary
to other Code policies.164
The restriction requiring express warranties to be made
"while the deal is still warm" is severe. Apparently, the au-
thors are only comfortable with postformation warranties that
literally comply with the parenthetical illustration in Comment
7. They would recognize as warranties only those statements
made prior to the time "the buyer had passed the seller's
threshold ... or until some other necessarily arbitrary
limit."165 Since White and Summers believe that even allowing
these statements to be warranties "does some violence to nor-
mal contract doctrine," they "would urge a different rule for
seller's statements made more than a short period beyond the
conclusion of the agreement."166 This pronouncement is of par-
ticular significance because it concludes that "agreement" is a
"contract" in the classical sense of that term and assumes that
the precise moment when an agreement is concluded can be
determined under classical contract law. Yet Article 2 makes it
clear that such a precise determination is not only unnecessary
but, in the language of Comment 7, is also "not material.1 67 It
is material to White and Summers only because they have re-
jected the possibility that the concept of "bargain" in "basis of
162. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7.
163. J. WHITE & I. SUMMES, supra note 3, at 338.
164. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(1) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract."); U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (a) ("Un-
less otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a)
an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.").
165. J. WHrTE & IL SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 338.
166. Id.
167. See U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7. Moreover, the parenthetical expression
in Comment 7 is merely illustrative. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (An agreement suffi-
cient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of
its making is undetermined.).
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the bargain" is not the classical concept.16 8
The authors restrict the recognition of postformation war-
ranties even further. They argue that since Comment 7 re-
quires all such warranties to meet the requirements of section
2-209, these warranties must also comply with the statute of
frauds.169 They suggest that this provision is ambiguous and
can be read as prohibiting postformation warranties.o7 0 This ar-
gument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the reference in
Comment 7 to section 2-209 does not necessarily mean that all
postformation warranties must adhere to that section. It is not
the only basis for recognizing these warranties. The U.C.C.
drafters probably include 2-209 in Comment 7 so that the legal
world would feel comfortable with the new provision. An ex-
panded concept of bargain which is not burdened by pre-Code,
classical contracts notions is a radical departure from the un-
derstanding and vested interest learning of lawyers prior to en-
actment of the Code.i17 To argue that a warranty action
transcends classical contracts notions may suggest something
akin to a legal space odyssey for the lawyer or judge who is
comfortable only within the ambit of the logical structure of
168. An illustration will demonstrate the extremely restricted nature of
postformation warranties under the White and Summers view. A buyer of one
of the new Chrysler K automobiles contracts to purchase one even before all of
the literature and advertising is published. The car is delivered and only after
delivery does the buyer read subsequent advertising or literature containing af-
firmations of fact about the car. One or more affirmations is not true with re-
spect to this car, though it is true in relation to other exact models of the K car.
The manufacturer simply did not include one or more pieces of standard equip-
ment which the advertisement or literature indicates the buyer should have re-
ceived with his car and which, in fact, all other new K car owners have
received. It would be grossly unfair to deprive the buyer of a remedy merely
because they were not "bilateral." In the same vein, if this buyer contracted at
such an early time that the literature and advertising were not available until a
month or more after he signed the contract document, the court should not ac-
cept the White and Summers view that the "short period" for postformation
warranties had expired before the buyer read the statements. Similarly, it
would violate the spirit of the Code if statements that were contained in litera-
ture or advertisements were not express warranties merely because the state-
ments were not "face-to-face."
169. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (3). ('The requirements of the statute of frauds of
this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is
within its provisions.")
170. J. Wrrs & PM SUmMERs, supra note 3, at 338.
171. As Nordstrom suggests, warranty protection was always viewed as
available under a contracts rubric. R NoRDsTRoM, supra note 11, at 225. The
classification of warranty protection as contractual was based upon the felt ne-
cessity to characterize the cause of action as sounding either in contract or tort.
Therefore, if a breach of warranty action was brought, all of the baggage of con-
tract law seemed indispensable to that cause of action.
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classical contract law. 72 Absent extensive commentary to 2-313
describing the expanded concept of bargain, the suggestion
that postformation affirmations may be express warranties re-
quired a device to uphold the symmetry of the classical con-
tracts structure-the subsequent modification device. Although
the ardent followers of classical contract doctrine could view
even this as radical, there were many criticisms of the pre-ex-
isting duty rule by lawyers and judges who appeared otherwise
committed to classical contract theory. 73 Therefore, it was, it-
self, an acceptable change, and it could also satisfy the longing
for symmetry with respect to postformation warranties. To
suggest, however, that the subsequent modification concept is
the only basis for recognizing postformation warranties reveals
a total misunderstanding not only of the "basis of the bargain"
concept as used in 2-313, but of the whole thrust of the ex-
panded concept of the "bargain-in-fact" of the parties which Ar-
ticle 2 emphasizes. 7 4
Second, White and Summers, in their separate discussion
of 2-209(3) and related sections, argue for an interpretation
which, at least in the typical case, would not create a statute of
frauds bar to the recognition of postformation express warran-
ties. 75 Yet, they append to it a discussion of postformation
warranties in a foreboding fashion.176 They contend that a
modification must be in writing if it brings the deal within the
Statute of Frauds section for the first time, as when the price is
172. These people are comfortable even though that structure may have
been largely the ingenious creation of a few well-known legal scholars and
judges. The clearest example of this creation of classical contract law is the
theory of consideration that Holmes enunciated in his lectures. 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAw 227-46 [1881] (M. Howe ed. 1963). Differing perspectives ex-
ist as to the source of Holmes's theory. Compare G. GIMORE, DEATH OF CON-
TRACT 20 (1974) ("Holmes was, quite consciously, proposing revolutionary
doctrine and was not in the least interested in stating or restating the common
law as it was.") with Speidle, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1160, 1171 (1975) (Holmes's bargain theory
is more "evolutionary than revolutionary ... In fact, it might be described as
an intensely practical idea somewhat behind its time but sufficiently contempo-
rary to insure quick acceptance by student, bench, and bar.").
173. See, e.g., Rye v. Phillips, 203 Minn. 567, 569, 282 N.W. 459, 460 (1938). Mr.
Justice Stone's opinion contained the following dicta in describing the pre-ex-
isting duty rule: "[It] is one of the relics of antique law which should have
been discarded long ago. It is evidence of the former capacity of lawyers and
judges to make the requirement of consideration an overworked shibboleth
rather than a logical and just standard of actionability." Id. See also Ferson,
The Rule in Foakes v. Beer, 31 YALE L.J. 15 (1921).
174. See notes 26-46 supra and accompanying text.
175. See J. WHiTE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 3, at 42-44.
176. Id. at 44.
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raised above $500, if the modification falls in 2-201 on its own, or
if it changes the quantity term. 7 7 It is clear that the authors
are not comfortable with postformation warranties, and are ea-
ger to identify, and even exacerbate, all of the conceivable ob-
stacles to the recognition of such warranties.
The refusal of a court to recognize postformation warran-
ties on any of these bases manifests adherence to an outworn
notion of bargain not contemplated by the Code. Moreover, it
ignores the critical test set forth in Comment 7-the only Code
language to guide a court in this area-that such language or
samples or models may fairly be regarded as part of the con-
tract. 7 8 A buyer expects to receive not only that which the
seller agrees to provide in statements made before or immedi-
ately after the deal, but also that which all other buyers, simi-
larly situated, receive as part of their deals for the identical
product. It would be quite difficult to convince buyers that they
are not entitled to the features they learn about some time,
even a relatively long time, after the contract is formed. It
would be virtually impossible to convince buyers that a seller
who refuses to provide the features that the seller promised to
provide, albeit after the time of contract formation, is operating
in good faith and is not simply using technical arguments to
avoid delivering "what it is that the seller has in essence
agreed to sell." 7 9 If good faith is a requirement which all com-
mentators, including White and Summers, insist is omnipres-
ent in the Code,180 it is impossible to regard a seller's refusal to
perform such postformation warranties as honest, commer-
cially reasonable, and ultimately fair conduct.
The inevitable conclusion of White and Summers is that
the "basis of the bargain" test does not and should not change
the outcome in any case.181 After all, "[w]hy should one who
has not relied on the seller's statement have the right to
sue?"' 8 2 Their prediction that the reliance requirement is and
always will be a part of the express warranty analysis may un-
177. Id. However, postformation warranties do not typically refer to quanti-
ty or price changes, but rather relate to the quality or performance of the
product.
178. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7 provides: "The precise time when words of
description or affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material. The
sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be re-
garded as part of the contract."
179. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 4.
180. See notes 218-23 infra and accompanying text.




fortunately be correct. Since courts tend to rely heavily upon
their important work, their prediction may be a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
B. THE NORDSTROM ANALYSIS
The other reliable and sound presentation of sales law is
the significant contribution of Professor Robert Nordstrom.183
The Nordstrom analysis of "basis of the bargain" is diametri-
cally opposed to the White and Summers analysis. Nordstrom
recognizes that section 2-313(1) is a dramatic change from sec-
tion 12 of the Uniform Sales Act. He asserts that the Code sim-
ply "dropped the reliance test" regarding express warranties
and substituted a "basis of the bargain" test.184 Nordstrom
clearly rejects any allegiance to pre-Code contract principles in
his attempt to unravel the mystery of "basis of the bargain."
The word 'bargain' is not encrusted with pre-Code concepts which had
attached themselves to contract formation-notions that a contract
came into existence at some specific point in time, some split second
when offer and acceptance coincided, thereafter to be binding unless a
new contract complete with the trappings of agreement and considera-
tion superseded the old one. The Code's word is 'bargain'-a process
which can extend beyond the moment in time that the offeree utters
the magic words, 'I accept.'1 85
This is the essence of the Nordstrom analysis. He rejects the
limitations on postformation warranties that White and Sum-
mers suggest. For example, if a seller makes a statement about
the goods after the formation of a classically defined "contract,"
Nordstrom suggests that a court could enforce the express war-
ranty as a subsequent modification.186 The lack of any bilateral
understanding between the parties does not trouble him.187
Nordstrom recognizes postformation warranties either be-
cause they are included in the expanded concept of bargain or,
if a court is more comfortable with a traditional analysis, be-
cause they are subsequent modifications of a bargain already
made. 88 If the modification basis is chosen, he assumes the
purchaser will invariably consent to extended warranty protec-
tion, thus making the statement an effective modification under
183. See R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 11.
184. Id. at 205.
185. Id. at 206.
186. Id. at 206-07.
187. He notes that "it is reasonable to assume that a buyer would agree to
an expansion of his warranty protection." Id. at 207.
188. Id. As noted above, the subsequent modification analysis is superflu-
ous. See notes 171-74 supra and accompanying text.
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section 2-209.189 He uses the same rationale to overcome an ob-
stacle which is very troublesome to White and Summers; if the
postformation warranty is effective, postformation disclaimers
should arguably be equally effective.190 Nordstrom effectively
disposes of this problem by assuming that the buyer would not
consent to a restriction on his existing warranty protection.191
In dealing with a seller's preformation statements that the
buyer does not read or learn of until after the traditional con-
tract is formed, Nordstrom abandons this subsequent modifica-
tion rationale, but still concludes that such statements are
express warranties.192 Unfortunately, his rationale is not
persuasive.
What is involved are a product and an injury, either to a person or to
property. The court's task is to determine whether that injury was
caused by a defect in the product, and any statements made by the
seller designed to induce the public to buy his product are relevant in
making this determination. The 'basis of the bargain' includes the
dickered terms but is not limited to them. The 'basis of the bargain' is
also the item purchased, and a part of that bargain includes the state-
ments which the seller made about what he sold. 19 3
The conclusory nature of Nordstrom's analysis is trouble-
some. He essentially states that all of the statements of fact
about the goods made by the seller become part of the basis of
the bargain because they become part of the basis of the bar-
gain. One possible interpretation of this rationale suggests a
strict liability notion, that is, every factual statement the seller
makes about the product will become part of the basis of the
bargain because the seller should bear the risk of any such
statements; the buyer should not be put to a burden of persua-
sion or proof which might involve reliance, inducement, or the
like. Yet, if this is the correct interpretation, why should the
seller assume such absolute liability for any statement of fact
relating to the goods? Instead, it would be preferable to rely on
the rationale that Nordstrom proposes for postformation war-
ranties-assume the buyer would agree to include the state-
ment in the bargain. The buyer will certainly have become
familiar with any statement of the seller before the buyer
makes his claim for breach of express warranty. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that the buyer would consent to any exten-
sion of his warranty protection, whether the statements were
189. Id. at 207.
190. See J. WHE & IL SUmmERs, supra note 3, at 446.
191. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 11, at 207.
192. Id. at 207-09.
193. Id. at 209.
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made after the contract was formed or had been made prior to
formation though the buyer was unaware of them.
The major weaknesses in Nordstrom's analysis are his
overemphasis on factual differences and his resulting refusal to
declare that reliance is not an essential element of the U.C.C.'s
novel "basis of the bargain" test.194 In discussing whether a
seller can successfully argue that a statement is not an express
warranty because there was no reliance, Nordstrom states only
that one must make a careful analysis of the factual pattern.195
The excessive weight that Nordstrom attaches to myriad fac-
tual patterns may be the cause of its lack of success.196 The
three "principles" that Nordstrom finds in the Code, designed
to assist courts in deciding whether there is an express war-
ranty, reflect this overemphasis. First, the court must deter-
mine, under all surrounding circumstances, whether the
seller's statement was a statement that the buyer should have
reasonably interpreted as a warranty.197 Moreover, the Code
does not require that the statement be the sole basis for the
bargain; it merely has to be "a part of the basis of the bar-
gain." 9 8 Finally, the statement must be "a part of the basis of
the bargain." 99 If the resulting bargain does not rest upon the
statement even in part, the statement will not become an ex-
press warranty.200
An example that illustrates the last "principle" is indicative
of the other Nordstrom examples:
The buyer who examines and discovers a defect could conceivably also
be purchasing without a warranty that a seller's prior affirmation would
194. In discussing whether reliance is an essential element, Nordstrom de-
clares: 'This question is not easily answered, in large part because of the vary-
ing factual patterns which can present it." Id. at 205.
195. "As the facts change, so may the result." Id. at 210. Nordstrom later
reiterates his belief that different factual situations can engender different re-
sults. "[N] o single rule can provide an answer to all of these factual patterns."
Id.
196. The typical judicial reaction to the problem of the "basis of the bar-
gain" mystery is to divide courts and authorities into reliance and no-reliance
camps. See notes 123-26 supra. The Nordstrom analysis is often simply and in-
correctly cited as support for the latter view. Even a court which recognized
the Nordstrom concept of the expanded meaning of bargain belied its under-
standing of that concept in its holding. See Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber
Sales Inc., 280 Or. at 788, 572 P.2d at 1326. For further discussion of Autzen, see
notes 74-87 supra and accompanying text. The confusion attributable to Nord-
strom's overemphasis of factual differences illustrates the difficulty in using
Nordstrom's approach.
197. R No ssThOM, supra note 11, at 210.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 211.
200. Id.
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have created. This result (no warranty) ought to be reached only if the
trier of fact is convinced that the representation formed no part of the
basis of the bargain.
2 0 1
How does the trier of fact decide whether a representation
was or was not a part of the basis of the bargain? The only an-
swer provided by the final Nordstrom analysis is that the ques-
tion is one of fact.202 Thus, even Nordstrom's analysis,
designed to enlighten courts, reverts to an excessive depen-
dence on the facts.
Among all of the writers who have attempted to explain
"part of the basis of the bargain," Nordstrom stands alone in
recognizing that the concept of bargain transcends classical
limitations. It is the most promising analysis because it re-
quires a new and perhaps radical perspective by both courts
and lawyers if a workable description is to be determined. Yet,
it fails because Nordstrom does not supply the kind of guidance
which courts and lawyers can use. The analysis becomes so
mired in factual diversity that it suggests a non-analysis. Since
Nordstrom himself cannot proceed beyond this point, even the
one court which might have recognized the wisdom of his ex-
panded concept of bargain had insufficient guidance to pursue
the analysis. 203 Courts have felt compelled to resort to tradi-
tional guides, or to substitute new terms which scarcely hide
their return to orthodox tests. 04
V. SOLUTION
The key to understanding the "basis of the bargain" test is
a recognition, pursuant to the initial work of Nordstrom, that
"bargain" transcends earlier connotations. One must, however,
be more specific than Nordstrom. It is important to set forth, as
precisely as possible, a workable test to determine its opera-,
tion. The test which courts must use is a familiar test: What
are the reasonable expectations of the buyer? The reasonable
expectations of the buyer are not relegated to those induced by
201. Id. at 212. Cf. B.W. Feed Co. v. General Equip. Co., 44 Or. App. 467, 605
P.2d 1205 (1979) (The seller supplied a truck with 5 to 7 ton capacity which
buyer examined. The truck did not comply with the capacity warranted. The
trier of fact determined that through examination the buyer knew that the
truck did not have 5 to 7 ton capacity; held no express warranty.).
202. R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 11, at 212.
203. See Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, 572 P.2d
1322 (1977); notes 74-87 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the Nordstrom
analysis is not cited more ofteh because, as indicated, it does not give adequate
guidance to courts. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affld, 568 F.2d
770 (3d Cir. 1977); notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the seller's promise. Nor are they relegated to those expecta-
tions which the buyer also relied upon in making the purchase.
Rather they are those expectations created by all of the "affir-
mations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a
bargain."2 05 Since the duration of the bargain in Article 2 tran-
scends the classical concept of bargain,206 this test will protect
those reasonable expectations that a seller's statements create,
regardless of when those statements were made or when the
buyer learned of them. 207 Up to this point, this Article has
merely argued that one should enforce postformation state-
ments, and preformation statements that the buyer does not
learn of until after formation, because Article 2 dictates that re-
sult. Given this suggested test of reasonable expectations,
however, one discovers other rationales.
In their classic analysis of the interests protected by con-
tract remedies, Fuller and Perdue develop reasons to protect a
party's expectation interest, despite nonreliance upon the
promise.208 They argue that a "psychological" justification,209 a
"will theory,"2 10 and an economic or institutional approach 21 '
205. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 3.
206. See notes 32-46 supra and accompanying text.
207. For a detailed analysis of the assertion that a seller's statements made
outside the classical bounds of a bargain engender reasonable expectations
that should be protected, see notes 223-31 infra and accompanying text.
208. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52 (1936). As noted earlier, White and Summers believe that if there is no
reliance, there can be no basis for the buyer to recover. "Why would one who
has not relied on the seller's statement have the right to sue?" J. WHrrE & IL
Sum Rs, supra note 3, at 339. This question is a virtual paraphrase, presuma-
bly unintended, of the same question posed by Fuller and Perdue: "[W]hy
should a promise which has not been relied on ever be enforced at all.. ?"
Fuller & Perdue, supra, at 57. Unlike White and Summers, Fuller and Perdue
do not ask the question rhetorically. They develop the philosophical and eco-
nomic bases for the protection of the expectation interest. See id. at 57-66.
209. Id. at 56-57. This rationale suggests that one should protect an expecta-
tion interest to avoid disappointment or the feeling that the promisee has been
deprived or cheated. They conclude this is reasonable, but not the key to the
problem.
210. Id. at 57. This rationale suggests that the contracting parties have, in
effect, produced legislation that should be enforced. Although they conclude
this too is reasonable, it is still an insufficient explanation.
211. Id. at 59. The economic or institutional approach provides a more
promising solution. Since a credit economy tends to eliminate the distinction
between present and future, "[e]xpectations of future values become, for pur-
poses of trade, present values." Id. See MacNeil, The Many Futures of Con-
tract, 47 S. CAL L REV. 691, 800 (1974). For a recent economic analysis of the
basis for enforcing promises, see Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Exam-
ination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). Since expectancies in
such an economy are regarded as a kind of property, a breach of promise is an
actual injury to that property. Yet, promises were enforced before any general
system of credit was conceived. Therefore, the economic or institutional justifi-
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are insufficient, but find an acceptable basis in their "juristic"
explanation.212 Their juristic approach reveals three distinct
reasons to protect the expectation interest.213
The first principle is that one should compensate buyers
for the opportunities they lose and the gains they are pre-
vented from achieving because of the seller's statements.
Fuller and Perdue argue that the cure for these typically im-
measurable losses "may justify a categorical rule granting the
value of the expectancy as the most effective way of compen-
sating for such losses." 2 14 Secondly, the protection of the ex-
pectation interest may also be "a prophylaxis against the losses
resulting from detrimental reliance. 215 The expectation inter-
est is a more easily administered measure of recovery than the
reliance interest. Therefore, it offers a more effective sanction
against breach.216 Finally, Fuller and Perdue contend that pro-
tecting the expectancy promotes and facilitates reliance on
business agreements. If business agreements could be invali-
dated by asserting a lack of reliance, a "business man knowing,
or sensing that [this] stood in the way of judicial relief would
hesitate to rely on a promise in [a] case where the legal sanc-
tion was of significance to him."217 Requiring proof of reliance,
in effect, decreases reliance.
The U.C.C. suggests one more rationale for protecting the
expectation interest, the desire to encourage "good faith" bar-
gaining.218 The U.C.C. defines "good faith" in two sections. The
cation for the protection of the expectation interest may be viewed as a petitio
principii, that is, the protection of the expectation interest is the result rather
than the cause of legal intervention. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 208, at 59-60.
212. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 208, at 61-3.
213. Fuller and Perdue argue that a narrow conception of reliance would
protect the promisee against out-of-pocket losses, a clearly measurable quanti-
ty caused by the breach of promise. But there are other aspects of reliance,
"often very numerous and difficult to prove," which add to the "total reliance"
of the promisee. Id. at 60.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 61.
216. The authors suggest that enforcing a promise which has not been re-
lied upon has the same justification "as an ordinance which fines a man for
driving through a stop-light when no other vehicle is in sight." Id.
217. Id. at 62.
218. In addition to this rationale, the U.C.C. also indicates that it supports
the reasonable expectations of a party in its remedy provisions. The U.C.C. di-
rects courts to place the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed, U.C.C. § 1-106(1), with the added directive that they
should reject any doctrine which requires mathematical certainty: "Compensa-
tory damages are often at best approximate: they have to be proved with
whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more." U.C.C. § 1-
106 Comment 1. Specific U.C.C. remedies, including the remedy for breach of
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general definition, applicable to all articles, is in section 1-
201(19): "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct of
transaction concerned." 21 9 The Article 2 definition, pertaining
to the sale of goods, is in section 2-103(1) (b): "'Good faith' in
the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade."' 2 o The basic statutory "good faith" requirement for all
U.C.C. transactions is in section 1-203: "Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its per-
formance and enforcement."221 The need for "good faith" is
clear. If it was not present, commercial transactions would be
seriously impeded by the resulting lack of trust.=2 Breaking a
promise, or not intending to honor it when initially setting it
forth, frustrates a reasonable expectation and is not in good
faith.
Given the test requiring the protection of reasonable ex-
pectations, and a justification for that test, one must ask which
statements should trigger that protection. Certainly, a buyer
reasonably expects to receive goods that conform to any state-
ment of the seller when that statement has been communi-
cated to the buyer before the sale, whether the statement is in
the form of oral or written language, description, sample, or
model. These are the "dickered" terms of the deal and it is
more than likely that such statements have not only induced
the purchase, but also that they have probably caused the
buyer to rely upon them, at least to some extent, in purchasing.
While these statements would have become express warranties
under the most traditional pre-Code tests, these traditional
tests will not permit other statements of fact by the seller to
warranty, do not limit recovery to the value of the detriment incurred. If White
and Summers are correct in limiting express warranties to statements of the
seller which have been relied upon, the measurement, absent difficulties of
measurement, should be coextensive with the reason for enforcing the seller's
statement. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHL I REv. 1, 18-31 (1979). See
also J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoNTRAcTs § 91 (2d ed. 1974). There is no such
limitation in the U.C.C.
219. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
220. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b).
221. U.C.C. § 1-203. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also has a good
faith requirement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 205 (1981).
222. For further discussion of the good faith requirement, see Holmes, A
Contextual Study of Commercial Good Fait&-" Good-Faith Disclosure in Con-
tract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 381, 390-91 (1978). See also Farnsworth,
Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. T. REv. 666 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 VA. L REv. 195 (1968).
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become express warranties. Such tests are inadequate to ex-
plain the Code concept of "basis of the bargain." The reason-
able buyer expects more than goods which simply conform to
express warranties in the "dickered" sense. While the buyer
gives his specific assent to any dickered warranty, he also gives
his blanket assent to any undickered statements about the
goods.223
Consider a situation where the seller makes a statement,
for the first time, after a sale is concluded. This is the typical
postformation statement outlined in Comment 7 to section 2-
313. These postformation statements clearly fall within the sug-
gested test. For example, suppose a seller makes a statement
relating to the performance capability of a computer after it is
purchased and delivered to a buyer. The buyer has a reason-
able expectation that the statement is true. Moreover, all the
reasons for protecting this reasonable expectation are clearly
present. The buyer may forgo other opportunities which he
does not even consciously consider as a result of the seller's
statement. He may attempt to operate the computer according
to the seller's representation and suffer some measurable loss.
If the seller's statement is not enforceable, the inevitable result
will be an impairment of facilitation of business arrangements.
Finally, the seller's defense, in which he asserts an excuse
based on the timing of his statement, would manifest obvious
bad faith.
Next, consider the situation in which the seller makes a
preformation statement that the buyer does not learn of until
after the goods are purchased and delivered. One should ini-
tially note that this situation is virtually indistinguishable from
a postformation warranty. To make it a warranty under Com-
ment 7, the buyer would only have to ask the seller about the
matter contained in the pre-existing statement and have the
seller restate it. Distinguishing between a statement that the
seller merely restates and a statement that the seller does not
restate is antagonistic to the express antitechnical nature of Ar-
ticle 2.224 It also smacks of the Slade's Case22 5 rationale that
223. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 97.
224. For examples of the antitechnical nature of Article 2, see U.C.C. § 2-
204(3) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."); U.C.C.
§ 2-209(1) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding."); U.C.C. § 2-309(1) ("The time for shipment or de-
livery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or
agreed upon shall be a reasonable time."); U.C.C. § 2-206 Comment 1 ("Former
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should have been overcome by now. 226
These preformation statements, later heard by the buyer,
are also subject to the same dangers as postformation state-
ments. Suppose the seller has made written statements about
the goods contained in a publication-for example, an owner's
manual-that the buyer reads only after the goods are
purchased and delivered. The manual contains a statement of
various features of the goods that the buyer was not aware of
prior to the purchase. Although the buyer was not specifically
aware of these features prior to the sale, even before purchas-
ing the buyer reasonably expected any statements by the seller
in such a publication to be true. The buyer will not expect the
product to have only those features that he or she remembers
it has from reading the owner's manual. The buyer will feel op-
pressed227 and unfairly surprised 228 if the goods do not contain
the features represented in the sales literature. If the product
does not meet the standards set forth in the owner's manual,
the buyer will not only be disappointed, but may also forbear
other opportunities that are immeasurable. Moreover, the
buyer may rely upon the seller's statement in attempting to use
the goods pursuant to the statement, resulting in personal in-
jury or economic loss. If courts recognized the seller's defense
that the statement cannot be a warranty because the buyer
read the statement only after purchase, business arrangements
would be seriously impaired. If every preformation statement
had to be read or heard, if every examination of a sample or
model had to be meticulously complete, and if no postforma-
tion statement in any form could be trusted, buyers would be
technical rules as to acceptance, such as requiring that telegraphic offers be ac-
cepted by telegraphed acceptance, etc., are rejected .... "); U.C.C. § 2-209 Com-
ment 1 ('This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and
desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities
which at present hamper such adjustments."); U.C.C. § 2-304 Comment 1
("While it continues the essential intent and purpose of the Uniform Sales Act
it rejects any purely verbalistic construction in disregard of the underlying rea-
son of the provisions."). See also U.C.C. § 1-102(1) ('This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.");
U.C.C. § 1-103 (allowing for the use of supplementary general principles of law);
U.C.C. § 1-106 Comment 1 ("[T]o negate the unduly narrow or technical inter-
pretation of some remedial provisions of prior legislation .... ").
225. Slade's Case, 4 Coke 92(b), 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Q.B. 1602).
226. Slade's Case held that if a party breached his agreement to pay for a
chattel, unless the promise was under seal, the only action was for debt. If,
however, the breaching party subsequently promised to pay, the second prom-
ise would permit the action to be brought in assumpsit.
227. See U.C.C. § 2-302 Comment 1.
228. See U.C.C. § 2-207 Comment 4.
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forced to incredible cautionary efforts before concluding the
technical contract of sale.229 Finally, a seller's defense based
on the buyer's lack of awareness 230 violates the U.C.C.'s re-
quirement of good faith.231
Does this analysis reduce "part of the basis of the bargain"
to a nullity? Clearly not. One should not read section 2-313
under this analysis as making any statement relating to the
goods an express warranty, regardless of when it is made. The
comments to section 2-313 indicate that the seller may show
that the statements were not express warranties by "clear af-
firmative proof' 232 or "good reason."233 The most obvious case
of "clear affirmative proof' or "good reason" is evidence of the
withdrawal of the statement prior to the closing of the deal.
For example, if the seller has made a statement relating to one
model of goods, and the buyer indicates an interest in another
model, the seller's statement that the second model does not
have the feature attributed to the first is an obvious withdrawal
of the express warranty.
A less obvious example is the implied withdrawal of an ex-
press warranty. A seller may have made statements of fact
about goods so long before the purchase that a buyer could not
reasonably expect these statements to attach to the purchased
goods. Express warranties do not last forever. Yet, their dura-
tion is extensive. The duration of the bargain begins with any
statement in advertising made by the seller, even long before
the goods are purchased, so long as the buyer can reasonably
expect that the statement is still true at the time of purchase.
Thus, any statement by the seller relating to a particular model
of automobile would continue as long as that model was sold
absent an express withdrawal of the statement by the seller
prior to the purchase.
Other illustrations of statements which do not meet the
"basis of the bargain" test include a seller's statement that the
229. Posner noted, "It is uneconomical to require people to be too careful."
R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYsIs OF LAw 70 (2d ed. 1977).
230. Such a response would be "indecent" in Llewellyn's terms. See K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 97, at 364.
231. The dangers detailed above will also appear in other examples of un-
read or unheard preformation warranties. For instance, a buyer could examine
a sample or model of the product before purchase, and fail to observe a particu-
lar feature. If after purchase the buyer discovers a feature of that sample, the
buyer will expect the the product purchased contains that feature.
232. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 3.
233. Id. at Comment 8.
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buyer knows is untrue.234 If an expert buyer examines the
goods and discovers that the seller's statements are untrue,
such a buyer cannot reasonably expect the goods to conform to
the statements.235 Another situation is illustrated by the Fibres
case discussed earlier.236 A description of the goods or per-
formance specification appears, on its face, to be an obvious
statement of fact relating to the goods. Yet, if there is clear, af-
firmative proof that the parties did not regard that statement as
anything more than an aspiration-a hope, target, or goal-the
buyer should have no reasonable expectation with respect to
that stated specification.
While these illustrations do not exhaust the possible varia-
tions of a seller's statements that do not become part of the ba-
sis of the bargain, they do emphasize the narrow scope of
escape from the broad, reasonable expectations of the buyer.
Yet, even under a "rebuttable presumption" test, such as White
and Summers suggest, it will be difficult for a seller to prove
that his or her statements are not express warranties. Cer-
tainly, the comments to section 2-313 strongly suggest that es-
cape from the basis of the bargain will be unusual. Most
important, these illustrations of statements that are not within
the basis of the bargain, together with the numerous illustra-
tions of statements that are part of the basis of the bargain, in-
dicate that the suggested test is workable.
To determine what is or what is not part of the basis of the
bargain by determining the reasonable expectations of the
buyer is not a mechanical test. Yet, no test can be mechanical
if the essential question is the determination of the bargain-in-
fact of the parties. It is a question of fact. But it is not a more
difficult question than innumerable other questions of fact
which courts decide comfortably and with familiarity. Like all
such questions, there will be difficult cases and there will be
dissenting views. A reasonable expectation test, however, is no
more difficult than either a reliance or inducement test.2 37 In
234. See City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Mach. Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
-461, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); 200 East End Ave. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 5 A.D.2d
415, 417-18, 172 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411-12 (1958).
235. See B.W. Feed Co. v. General Equip. Co., 44 Or. App. 285, 605 P.2d 1205,
1208 (1980).
236. See notes 110-22 supra and accompanying text.
237. One could even suggest that the change in the Code over the Uniform
Sales Act test under the Williston interpretation is simply whether the state-
ment of the seller would have induced a reasonable buyer to purchase the
goods had such buyer known of the statement prior to the purchase. This
would be an unfortunate expression of the new test, however, since it uses the
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making this determination of fact, a court must consider all of
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, not restricting
itself to classical concepts of contract or bargain.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that a reliance or inducement
test under section 2-313 is contrary to the terms of the statute
and its comments. Under an expanded concept of basis of the
bargain, courts should recognize both postformation warranties
and preformation warranties that a buyer does not learn of un-
til after the formation of the contract. In their "rebuttable pre-
sumption" test, severely limiting postformation warranties,
White and Summers fail to discern this expanded concept.
Nordstrom perceives it, but then fails to derive an adequate
test. The proper analysis concentrates on and protects a
buyer's reasonable expectations. This is the only test that con-
forms to the statutory language, the comments, and the under-
lying philosophy of Article 2.
term "induce" and would still require justification in terms of the suggested
test. any statement of the seller about the goods to which the buyer reasonably
expects his purchased goods to conform is part of the basis of the bargain and,
therefore, constitutes an express warranty under U.C.C. section 2-313(1).
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